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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
INSURANCE COMPANY'S ARBITRARY BEHAVIOR IS
NOT BAD FAITH
Slater v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.
174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962)
An insured automobile driver struck a pedestrian at an intersection in
Zanesville, Ohio. After pleading guilty to the charge of failure to yield the
right of way, he was sued by the pedestrian for $69,681.52. The insured
notified his insurance company and the company assumed the defense, ad-
vising him of his right to employ independent counsel-a right which ap-
parently was never exercised. Counsel for the pedestrian wrote the insurer
that, as a result of conversations with two of the insurer's agents, he inferred
that maximum coverage under the insurance policy was $5000 but that
neither agent had been definite on the subject. The purpose of the letter was
to inform the insurer that the injured party would settle the claim for the
policy limit. The offer was to remain open until the final jury verdict was
returned.
Immediately preceding the trial, counsel for the insurer offered to settle
the case for $5000 and pay the costs. However, the insurance company would
not officially disclose the policy limits, thus precluding settlement. A verdict
in favor of the injured pedestrian was returned for $20,000. The maximum
liability of the insurance company was $5000, leaving the insured with a
personal liability of $15,000.
The insured thereupon sued the insurance company for $15,000 asserting
that its obstinancy in refusing to reveal officially the policy limit and thus
settle the suit for $5000 constituted a lack of good faith. The common pleas
court found for the insured and the court of appeals affirmed without written
opinion. The supreme court, by a narrow 4-to-3 margin, reversed the lower
courts and held that "although ... [the insurance company's behavior] may
have been arbitrary and a display of poor judgment ... , [its conduct] ...
falls short of bad faith as a matter of law."1
The one Ohio authority cited by the court was Hart v. Republic Mutual
Insurance Co.,2 the only case involving an insurer's responsibility to settle
within policy limits which has heretofore reached the supreme bench in Ohio.
In Hart the court adopted the lack of good faith test as opposed to the
negligence test which a minority of jurisdictions has adopted.3 In the personal
injury suit, claimant sued for $31,000 and before trial the insurer refused three
separate offers to settle, at $1113, $4500, and $4000. Policy limits were
$6000/12,000. A verdict of $19,400 was returned and levy was had upon the
insured trucker's two trucks which were his only means of livelihood. Even
I Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 152, 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962).
2 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949).
3 See Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1485 (1931), 131 A.L.R. 1500 (1941), 40 A.L.R.2d 178
(1955).
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after judgment, the insured induced the claimant to settle for $6000, but again
the insurer refused. Hart recovered a verdict from the insurance company, but
the trial court charge erroneously allowed the jury to find on either negligence or
bad faith. The supreme court reversed but remanded, holding that the jury
might have found against the insurer if charged upon "bad faith" alone.
The court rejected the negligence test and looked to the insurer's be-
havior as measured against the bad faith test. A bona fide belief in the lack
of liability might justify a refusal to settle, but "such a belief may not be an
arbitrary or capricious one." 4 The judges concluded that the injuries in-
volved were serious and permanent, that the company had no eyewitnesses
in its behalf, and that the first offer of settlement had been small. Even later
offers were but a fraction of the verdict. In addition, both the insured and
insurer's local agent had pleaded with the home office to settle. From this
record the court determined that a jury might have found bad faith.
Two earlier Ohio courts of appeals have wrestled with the settlement
question.5 Neither of these cases was mentioned in Slater although both pur-
port in their syllabi to adopt the "lack of good faith" rule applied in Slater.
Cleveland Wire held that the insurer was not required to settle by "good
faith" and that he had the right to estimate and value the probability of the
claimant's recovering a large verdict. Here the policy limit was $5000. The
insured prompted a settlement offer from the claimant for $7500 and offered
to pay $2500 of his own if the insurer would put up $5000. The insurer
offered only $3500. No settlement was reached, and a $20,000 verdict was
returned. Apparently the insurer had warned the insured that the verdict
would probably be in excess of $10,000. By its offer of settlement, however,
it admitted its liability only to the extent of 70% of the coverage. Here the
court protected the insurer's right to "gamble" on the probability of a large
verdict-a right, according to the court, which insured valued at $1500. It
might be surmised that this case formulates a mathematical test for good faith
based upon how highly the insurer values his right to gamble on the verdict.
Although Spang adheres to the bad faith test in the syllabus, one wonders
after reading the opinion if the actual test applied was not in fact one of
negligence or due care. The court reversed and remanded a lower court's
directed verdict for the defendant-insurer, holding that on the facts a jury
might have found for the insured. The policy limits were $10,000/20,000.
Suits totalling $55,000 were brought by the injured claimant. An offer of
settlement was made by claimant for $5500 but the insurer refused, asserting
as a reason the fact that it had reinsured $5000 of its liability. The insurer
offered $4250 and no more, asking the insured to put up $1250. Since the
insurance company feared that the verdict would go over the policy limits,
it urged the insured to settle.
Much of the language in the opinion, taken from supporting cases, was
4 Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 2, at 188, 87 N.E.2d at 349.
5 Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 6 Ohio App.
344 (1917), motion to certify overruded, 62 Ohio L.B. 315 (1917); Spang Baking Co. v.
Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 68 N.E.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1946).
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directed toward negligence and the reasonable course under the circumstances.
The court concluded its opinion:
The foregoing cases represent the almost unanimous holding
of the courts of last resort on the duty of an insurer to act fairly
and exercise reasonable care to protect the interests of its assured
in any reasonable offer of settlement made within the coverage of
the policy upon a claim against the assured. (Emphasis added.) 6
This opinion seems essentially to merge the bad faith test with the negligence
test-a result which one eminent authority feels is certainly not aberrational.7
Unfortunately the Hart and Slater decisions seem to rebuke the explanation
of the bad faith rule as articulated in Spang and appear to be thwarting the
modern trend toward encouraging settlement by insurers at a reasonable offer
within the policy limits.
The result reached by the supreme court in Slater is not only shocking
to an ordinary sense of right and justice, but it is very questionable when
viewed in the light of what little Ohio authority exists. Here the insurance
company offered to settle for $5000, the maximum amount for which it could
be liable under the policy limits. It knew that all it need do to settle was
inform opposing counsel officially of the policy limits. Yet it refused to do
so. The court calls this behavior good faith. In fact Judge Zimmerman,
writing for the majority, shifts the onus of blame, suggesting that the
claimant's behavior was unreasonable: "By the information coming to him
from two sources, counsel for [claimant] could not reasonably have doubted
that the maximum limit of liability under the policy was $5000. 's
Did not counsel for the injured pedestrian have a right to condition his
settlement upon official disclosure? Was he required by the rule of reason to
settle his claim without knowing to his satisfaction what the actual coverage
was? His claim was certainly a good one, or so the insurer thought, as indi-
cated by its offer to settle for an amount equal to its maximum liability. What
conceivable good faith reason could the insurance company have had for
refusing to make the requested official revelation when it was ostensibly
willing to pay out all that it could possibly be held liable for under the con-
tract? This refusal is clearly obtuseness of the rankest variety. The court
itself calls it "arbitrary and a display of poor judgment." 9 Yet this, says the
Ohio court, is "good faith," for to say otherwise is to reach "an unfair and
wrong result."'1
The one Ohio case cited by Judge Zimmerman certainly does not dictate
this result. There the court, announcing the "bad faith" test while holding
6 Id. at 586, 68 N.E.2d at 127.
7 Keeton, "Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement," 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1136, 1141 (1954): "With the skillful advocacy for the insured . . . the 'bad faith rule'
in operation is close to the practical equivalent of the 'negligence rule' even if the
standards themselves are sharply distinguished."
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against the insurer and remanding for further jury determination, suggested
that a test for bad faith was whether the insurer had a bona fide belief in
lack of liability on its part, i.e., "reasonable justification."" The court said
that the insurer's behavior must not be "arbitrary."' 2 In Slater the court
says the insured acted in an arbitrary manner but that is not bad faith.
Although the other two Ohio cases discussed above were not cited in
Slater, they certainly are relevant to the question of what the bad faith test
is in Ohio. Even though Cleveland Wire went against the insured, it sug-
gested that the insurer's activity was justified because is had a right to
gamble on the probability of the claimant's recovering less than the policy
limits. By offering to settle for $3500 under a potential liability of $5000,
the insurer valued his right at $1500. How highly does the insurance com-
pany in Slater value its right when it offers to settle for $5000 under a
potential liability of $5000? This offer of settlement is tantamount to an
admission on the part of the company that it is liable to the full amount of
the policy. In Cleveland Wire the court emphasized the fact that the in-
surance company had in no way admitted liability to the full extent of
coverage.' 3
Spang, although articulating a bad faith rule in the syllabus, applied
the equivalent of a negligence test. Under that application, Motorists
Mutual in Slater can hardly be said to have acted "fairly" and "with reason-
able care to protect the interests of its assured in any reasonable offer of
settlement made within [policy limits] .... ,,14
Thus it appears that this most recent application of the "bad faith"
rule comports neither with fairness nor judicial precedents in Ohio. It fore-
bodes a protectionist policy for the insurance companies. It is true, as Judge
Taft said in his dissent in Hart, that if the insured wants more insurance, he
can buy it.' 5 But should Mr. Slater be required to buy more insurance to
cover a claim which his insurance company can settle within the $5000
policy?
It is suggested that the extent to which the insurance company reason-
ably recognizes that there is a very strong case against its insured should
weigh heavily in a court's mind when it applies the bad faith test to a refusal
to settle within policy limits. An offer to settle for $5000 against a potential
liability of $5000 indicates convincingly that Motorists Mutual thought very
little of its chances in the courtroom. With this as background, an arbitrary
refusal to disclose officially the limits of the policy is "bad faith" by any
reasonable test-the equivalent of an arbitrary and capricious refusal to
settle.
11 Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 2, at 188, 87 N.E.2d at 349.
12 Ibid.
13 Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., supra note
4, at 353.
'4 Spang Baking Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., supra note 6, at 586, 68 N.E.2d
at 127.
15 Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 2, at 190, 87 N.E.2d at 350.
